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Scale-dependency and Downward Causation in Biology 
Abstract 
This paper argues that scale-dependence of physical and biological processes offers resistance 
to reductionism and has implications that support a specific kind of downward causation. I 
demonstrate how insights from multiscale modeling can provide a concrete mathematical 
interpretation of downward causation as boundary conditions for models used to represent 
processes at lower scales. The autonomy and role of macroscale parameters and higher-level 
constraints are illustrated through examples of multiscale modeling in physics, developmental 
biology, and systems biology. Drawing on these examples, I defend the explanatory 
importance of constraining relations for understanding the behavior of biological systems.   
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1. Introduction 
Appeals to top-down effects are common in biology as well as philosophy, but the notion of 
downwards causation is often considered problematic or superfluous. Critics have argued that 
if macroscale phenomena comprise nothing but molecular entities and processes, downward 
causation would result in causal overdetermination (e.g., Kim 1998). Accordingly, higher-
level causation and downwards causation either collapse into lower-level causation or result in 
a violation of the physical laws that apply to lower-level constituents (Kim 2000). From this 
perspective, talking of downwards causation seems misguided, in science as well as 
philosophy. This paper stresses that a different interpretation of downward causation is 
required for understanding scientific practice. By drawing on insights from multi-scale 
modeling I defend a kind of downward causation that differs in important ways from the usual 
target of philosophical criticism.  
Downward causation in the context of biology typically refers to top-down effects or 
control relations between parts and wholes in compositional hierarchies that span different 
levels (Campbell 1974; Noble 2012).1 Importantly, not all appeals to downward causation are 
																																								 																				
1	In the following I refer to “levels” when explicitly addressing part-whole relations in a 
functional system (see also Kaiser 2015), but I prefer the term “scale” when talking of spatial 
scaling more generally. I shall not discuss hierarchical control in this paper but concentrate on 
the relevance of scale-dependency for discussions on downwards causation.  	
To appear in the Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, in Philosophy of 
Science.  
	
equally metaphysically suspicious. The target of Kim’s criticism is what Emmeche et al. 
(2000) refer to as strong downward causation. Strong downward causation is understood as 
causal relations between levels that are sharply distinguished and autonomous, i.e., it is based 
on a claim about the existence of qualitatively different domains or levels. Thus understood, 
downward causation may be subject to criticisms akin to those held against substance dualism 
and vitalism that defend a too radical divorce between levels. Emmeche et al. argue that strong 
downward causation is incompatible with a scientific viewpoint that accepts constitutive (or 
ontological) reduction in the broad sense (see also Brigandt and Love 2017).2  
Yet, an alternative to the strong account is to interpret top-down effects as operating 
via constitutive or constraining relations given by the boundaries and organization of the 
system as a whole (Emmeche et al. 2000; see also Craver and Bechtel 2007; Bechtel 2017). 
Downward causation thus understood is a synchronic or non-temporal constraining relation. 
Constraints are features that delimit the degree of freedom of system behavior, e.g., by 
reducing and directing the available free energy or the possible states of the system (Pattee 
1971; Hooker 2013). By setting boundaries that organize and restrain causal processes, 
constraints make some states inaccessible but also enable other dynamic states. Having a rigid 
skeleton, for instance, limits functional flexibility of body parts but also enables upright 
																																								 																				
2	Emmeche et al. (2000) further note that if a substantial qualitative difference between levels 
is accepted, bottom-up causation would be equally suspicious. 	
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movement on land (see Hooker 2013 and Bechtel 2017 for more elaborated and additional 
examples). Whereas macroscale systems can always be broken down into lower-level 
constituents, the organizational and relational features necessary for functional capacities may 
not be reducible to properties of lower-level constituents. Downward causation in this sense is 
less metaphysically suspicious, but the significance of downward causation as a type of 
constraining relations needs to be further specified.   
The alternative approach to downward causation can be further distinguished into a 
weak and a medium account (Emmeche et al. 2000). Both appeal to top-down effects as 
constraining relations between parts and wholes in an organized system or mechanism, but 
they differ in their emphasis on the autonomy of higher-level (or higher-scale) entities. Weak 
downward causation can be exemplified by dependence-relations between system parameters 
in a phase space. A phase space may describe the possible states of a network of interactions at 
a molecular level, but the dynamic structure of the network as a whole is considered a higher-
level entity. Because the interactions between system components constrain the degree of 
freedom or scope of possible interactions between network components, these behave 
differently than they would outside the system. Similarly, Bechtel (2017) has argued that top-
down effects in biology can be exemplified through the use of graph theoretical 
representations of networks in systems biology and neuroscience. In these contexts, network 
models are used to identify functional modules, interconnections between different 
mechanisms, and organizational constraints that influence how individual components react to 
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external stimuli. Network properties, such as stable attractors, bifurcations, functional 
modules, organizational constraints, etc., cannot be ascribed to molecular entities in isolation 
but are properties of the system as a whole.3   
I shall focus on what Emmeche et al. (2000) call medium downward causation. This 
position more explicitly defends the autonomy of higher-level entities by highlighting the role 
of functional language or boundary conditions. One version of medium downward causation 
stresses that the ascriptions of functions to biological parts and systems are irreducible to 
physics. The argument is that accounting for living systems requires an understanding of the 
constraining relations and informational patterns that control, select, order, and delimit the 
activity of lower-scale processes (Moreno and Umerez 2000). Instead, I focus on an 
interpretation of downward causation that emphasizes how boundary conditions “select and 
delimit various types of the system’s possible developments” (Emmeche et al. 2000, 25). This 
notion of downward causation is not necessarily limited to biology. Boundary conditions are 
generally understood as mathematically defined restrictions that specify the domains and 
conditions under which a given mathematical model or equation hold (e.g., by specifying a 
																																								 																				
3	Bechtel (2017) explicates that the “components” in the network need not belong to a 
common level or size of entities, and his examples may also support medium downward 
causation as clarified in the following. However, this paper focuses explicitly on scale-
dependence which is not the focus of Bechtel’s account. 	
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value interval for the possible solution). In this context, boundary conditions are understood as 
representations of the “conditions by which entities on a high level constrain the activity on 
the lower focal level” (Emmeche et al. 2000, 25).  
To exemplify medium downward causation, Emmeche et al. mention the boundary 
effect of natural selection in delimiting the frequency of genotypes in an ecosystem, and how 
an organism provides organizational constraints that influence its constituent molecules and 
tissues. My aim in this paper is to further clarify and expand on this interpretation of 
downward causation by drawing on insights from in multiscale modeling in both physics and 
biology that support the autonomy and explanatory importance of higher-level parameters and 
models. I argue that attention to scale-dependency, the role of boundary conditions, and 
indispensability of macroscale models and parameters in such context can contribute to clarify 
and demystify downwards causation. Thus, the argument is not restricted to the biological 
domain but points to more general limitations for a reductionist approach to account for 
macroscale phenomena.  
I begin with some general reflections on the philosophical implications of what has 
been called the tyranny of scales problem in physics for discussions on downward causation 
and reductionism (Section 2). The notions of constraints and boundary conditions will be 
clarified through concrete examples of multiscale modeling in developmental and systems 
biology (Section 3). Section 4 further defends the explanatory importance of top-down 
constraining relations.  
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2. The Tyranny of Scales 
2.1. Limits of Reductionism in Physics and Biology 
If we accept that all physical and biological systems are made up of nothing but physical 
lower-level components (molecules, atoms, etc.), it seems intuitive that a description of how 
things work at lower level(s) should suffice for explaining also macroscale systems. For 
instance, Oppenheim and Putnam find it “natural to suppose that the characteristics of the 
whole can be causally explained and micro-reduced by a theory involving only characteristics 
of the parts” (Oppenheim and Putnam 1958, 15; see also Kim 2000). However, as we shall see 
below, the reductionist dream has proven difficult even within physics itself.  
Philosophers of physics have appealed to the tyranny of scales problem, i.e., the 
scientific challenge that physical behaviors, and the models and concepts we use to describe 
them, vary with spatial scales (Oden 2006; Batterman 2012; Wilson 2012). The concept of a 
material’s surface, for instance, attains a different meaning as we move from the macroscale to 
the nanoscale. At the nanoscale, the surface takes up most of the material which significantly 
changes the chemical properties and reactivity of the material. We therefore need different 
mathematical models and conceptual frameworks to account for the dominant behaviors at 
different scales (Bursten 2015). The problem is equally relevant in biology. Scholars 
investigating constraints on form and function of organisms have long been aware of how 
physical properties are scale-dependent. The significance of gravity, surface tension, inertia, 
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electrical charges, etc., changes across spatial scales. Whereas gravity places a strong 
constraint on the possible form of large organisms, gravity is a much weaker or even 
negligible force in the world of insects or bacteria. Their worlds are instead dominated by 
forces such as surface tension and the viscosity and resistance of the medium (Thompson 
1917[1992]; Purcell 1977; Schmidt-Nielsen 1984; Vogel 2003). 
An important consequence of the challenge is that we cannot uncritically apply 
macroscale models to describe microscale processes and vice versa. Macroscale models can 
often successfully ignore surface tension of materials, but this strategy becomes unfeasible 
when modelling nanomaterials (Bursten 2015). Similarly, we should be aware that 
mechanistic diagrams depicting molecular processes such as protein synthesis present an 
idealized picture of biological processes that, due to the small spatial and temporal scales, are 
characterized by stochastic dynamics in response to thermodynamic fluctuations (Skillings 
2015). Thus, conceptual frameworks adapted to the macroscopic physical world face 
limitations when applied to a microscopic world. Similarly, it is not possible to scale up 
microscopic models to describe all macroscopic processes because some macroscale 
properties are literally invisible if we zoom in on constituents at lower scales.  
A simple example is how the properties described by the ideal gas law – describing the 
relation between the gas volume, pressure, and temperature – cannot be attributed to 
individual gas molecules (Christiansen 2000). In analogy, many biological properties can only 
be understood through the integrated effects of cell populations or tissues and cannot be 
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accounted for at the molecular scale. For instance, the mechanical properties of skeletal 
structures like the notochord backbone in developing chordate embryos cannot be derived 
“bottom-up” but are analysed by measuring the macroscale physical forces acting on the 
structure as a whole. The biophysicist Lance Davidson and colleagues contend that “the 
capacity of the notochord to resist bending as it extends the embryo comes from the structure 
of the whole notochord. Measurements at the level of the individual collagen fiber or fluid-
filled cell that make up the structure would not reveal the mechanical properties of the whole 
notochord” (Davidson et al. 2009, 2017). Similarly, in the physical context, the bending 
properties and buckling strength of a steel beam cannot be derived from modelling of the 
micro-structure of steel (Batterman 2012). Such observations have important implications for 
our ability to describe multiscale systems through a unified framework targeting only a lower 
and more “fundamental” scale.   
An important consequence of the tyranny of scales problem is that no single 
mathematical framework can account for the behaviours of multiscale systems at all scales 
(Oden 2006). Because the concepts and models used to account for system behaviour are 
“multi-valued” across scales (Wilson 2012), scientists must identify the most relevant models 
and system parameters to account for processes at different scales. As we shall see, boundary 
conditions play a central role in the combination of models and in accounting for how system-
level constraints influence the dynamics of lower-scale processes.  
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2.2. Boundary Conditions and Constraining Relations 
When modelling processes across multiple scales, researchers must combine different 
mathematical models that each are suited for handling processes at a characteristic scale. To 
illustrate the role of boundary conditions in this process, we consider how the sound 
production in a violin is modelled (see Bursten 2015; Batterman 2017 for more detailed 
analyses). The model of the violin’s harmonics relates the lengths of sound waves to lengths of 
the segment of the string via a (partial differential) wave equation. This model is a continuum 
model that requires that the end points of the vibrating string be treated as zero-dimensional 
boundaries. If, however, the string remained fixed at the boundary of the nut and bridge of the 
violin, sound production and amplification by the sound box would be impossible. To account 
for the transfer of vibrational energy to the sound box, one needs to completely shift scales 
and consider the molecular interactions between the string and the bridge. This requires a 
structural model of a different mathematical type (ordinary differential equations).  
Although the violin is a relatively simple example compared to many in biology, it 
makes the point that there is no fundamental lower or higher level at which all relevant aspects 
can be described. Physical details must sometimes be ignored at characteristic scales, and 
accounting for the whole system requires complementary models. Bursten (2015) argues that 
the models stand in a non-reductive model interaction in which the models intersect at the 
point where boundary conditions for each model can no longer be ignored. The situation is 
similar in biology. Describing the development of the vertebrate limb requires developing 
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models at multiple scales. The partial differential equations used to model morphological 
deformations at the tissue-scale require treating cells as static entities fixed in time and space 
(Newman et al. 2011). The macroscale model thus ignores the details and discrete nature of 
cell and biomolecules. Microscale processes can, however, influence cell states and cell 
motility, and the continuum model must be combined with discrete models that capture 
microscopic details such as instance kinetic rates of particular proteins or movement of 
specific cells. These models, in turn, fail to account for macroscale biomechanical features, 
and bridging between scales is a difficult challenge (Davidson et al. 2009).  
To model macroscale properties one must often ignore some microscopic details. One 
may think that microscale structures are primarily ignored due to practical limitations such as 
tractability of models or lack of knowledge on microscale processes. Although practical 
implications are important, it should be stressed that macroscale models are often applicable 
precisely because they ignore certain microscale details that are irrelevant or even misleading 
to include in the modelling process at macroscales (see Batterman 2017). Macroscale 
regularities are often not derived from microscale ones, and microscale details are not always 
necessary or wanted. Tracking the specific dynamics of individual molecules in a gas would 
for instance not improve most applications of the ideal gas law because the microscopic 
fluctuations average out at higher scales.  
It is not just that the microscale details sometimes do not add anything. Studies of 
lower-level components and processes are often blind to central macroscale properties. 
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Understanding phenomena such as the temperature of a gas requires taking seriously the 
boundary conditions provided by the gas container. The physicist Peder V. Christiansen (2000, 
52) argues that boundary conditions in such contexts “determine the laws on the macroscopic 
level of the whole, i.e. the thermodynamic relations that are appropriate to the system, and 
they restrict the motion of the microscopic parts”. He argues that if the microscopic features, 
such as the shape and rigidity of the gas molecules, can be understood as “upward” causation, 
then boundary conditions represent horizontal causation (by determining how the laws are 
applied at a given scale) as well as downward causation (by restricting influence of the wall 
on the motion of the molecules). Attention to boundary conditions can thus provide insights to 
which aspects are most relevant at characteristic scales and to top-down effects resulting from 
the embedding of microscale processes in larger systems or macroscale structures.  
In multiscale modelling in developmental biology, boundary conditions are used to 
represent biomechanical constraints that influence the movement of epithelial sheets in the 
developing embryo (Davidson 2012). The movement of cells in developmental processes are 
directed by mechanical forces such as stress and strain, and understanding the influence of 
biomechanical forces and constraints involves the identification of macroscale parameters 
such as the material’s elastic modulus. These physical constraints and forces are not “visible” 
at microscale because they result from the integrated effects of cell population dynamics 
(Davidson et al. 2009). Boundary conditions in this context can thus reveal how the bending 
behaviour and deformations of epithelial sheets are dependent on biomechanical features of 
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the system as a whole, which may be interpreted as a form of downward causation (Green and 
Batterman 2016). The following section examines how these aspects are compatible with a 
notion of downwards causation proposed in the context of multiscale cardiac modelling in 
systems biology.  
 
3. Multiscale Modeling and Downward Causation 
Cardiac models are currently the most developed “virtual organs”, benefitting from decades of 
experimental work and mathematical modeling (Kohl and Noble 2009). A reductionist may 
assume that since the heart rhythm is constituted by electrical potentials determined by the 
quantity of ion flow across the cell membrane, bottom-up modeling of the heart rhythm should 
be possible. Closer attention to the modeling procedure however reveals that this is not the 
case. When developing multiscale cardiac models, systems biologists also face the problem of 
scale-dependency which requires the combination of multiple mathematical models (Qu et al. 
2011).  
Modeling often does start from a lower level. In this context models of ionic currents 
(molecular level) provide information to action potential models (cell level), as shown on 
Figure 1. However, the systems biologist Denis Noble (2012) demonstrates that before one 
can solve the differential equations accounting for the kinetics of ion channels, one must 
specify the initial and boundary conditions. An important boundary condition in this context is 
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the cell voltage that influences the gating of the channels. The cell potential is a cell parameter 
that cannot be measured via the techniques used to measure ion flow, because voltage-clamp 
techniques isolate individual channels or cells from their native environment. The boundary 
conditions for these models therefore need to be identified via microelectrode measurements 
on intact or (preferably) coupled cells (see Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1. Measurement techniques and model types used at different scales in the 
development of cardiac models. Reprinted by permission from the American Physiological 
Society, from Carusi et al. 2012.  
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There is a similar feedback between modeling of action potentials (based on the Hodgkin-
Huxley model) and propagation models describing features at the tissue level via partial 
differential equations. To arrive at a complete solution for a propagated action potential, one 
must not only account for the flow of ions and the capacitance of the membrane but also for 
how biophysical features of the tissue structures influence the speed of conduction and 
propagation of electrical currents (Qu et al. 2011). Examples of macroscale parameters are the 
radius of axons and the specific resistance and geometry of different tissue types. These 
parameters cannot be measured at lower scales but are defined via imaging technologies and 
manipulations of the whole tissue or organ (top of Figure 1; see Carusi et al. 2012).  
A possible response from the reductionist in the face of such models may be that the 
explanatory power still lies in the protein mechanisms involved in the gating of ion channels, 
and that the initial and boundary conditions just provide physical background conditions for 
the ionic current models.4 Yet, Noble’s (2012) example from multiscale cardiac modeling 
offers resistance to this view. First, he argues that the oscillatory dynamics constituting the 
pacemaker rhythm cannot be accounted for without the boundary conditions given by the cell 
																																								 																				
4	For instance,	Rosenberg (1997) argues that although the causal influence of macroscale 
factors (such as the maternal cellular structure) are acknowledged in molecular developmental 
biology, these conditions are not prioritized in the explanations developed within these fields 
(see also Rosenberg 2015; Weber 2005).  
 
To appear in the Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, in Philosophy of 
Science.  
	
structure. He refers to a computer experiment where the feedback from the membrane 
potential (cell voltage) to the ion channels is blocked. He observes that “without the 
downward causation from the cell potential, there is no rhythm” (Noble 2012, 58). Since the 
boundary conditions are essential to understanding and modeling the phenomena, it seems 
misleading to downgrade their explanatory relevance to background conditions.  
The second reason to resist the reductionist conclusion relates to the tyranny of scales 
problem. The idea that macroscale parameters (or boundary conditions) only offer background 
conditions for explanatory models presupposes that a lower-level model can unify all relevant 
aspects of multiscale systems. However, as the example of cardiac modelling illustrates, it is 
not possible to use ordinary differential equations (that here constitute the lower-scale models) 
as a framework of unification. The problem is that these are not well-suited for capturing the 
electrophysiological and biomechanical properties of tissue structures. As seen in the 
examples from physics and biology, macroscale properties are often modelled via continuum 
models (partial differential equations). These models are not just inputs to lower-scale models 
but capture phenomena that lower-scale models fail to account for. Moreover, they require 
parameters that cannot be measured at lower scales.  
In the context of cardiac modeling, the different models are brought together via 
simulation software. But this integration should not be considered a unifying framework in the 
traditional sense. Because processes at different scales influence each other in complex 
feedback relations, this must be done in an integrated fashion where the models inform each 
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other in many iterative steps (Carusi et al. 2012). That is, the simulation is not constructed as a 
bottom-up process. Rather, modelers must construct a system of models where the results of 
one model may identify the initial and boundary conditions for another model.5 Multiscale 
modeling is particularly challenging in biology because living systems have active boundaries 
that change over time, and various complex and nonlinear feedback-relations crosscut 
processes at different spatial and temporal scales.6  
If we wish to account for these aspects of multiscale modeling and biological 
functioning, we should not abandon the notion of downward causation but try to clarify its 
meaning and significance. Noble explicitly defends a view akin to what Emmeche et al. (2000) 
call medium downward causation when arguing that “downward causation is necessary and 
that this form of causation can be represented as the influences of initial and boundary 
conditions on the solutions of the differential equations used to represent the lower level 
processes” (Noble 2012, 55). The following section returns to the philosophical discussion of 
downward causation as a constraining relation and responds to the possible objection that this 
reinterpretation weakens the importance of top-down effects.  
																																								 																				
5	As also seen in the violin examples, models	representing processes at different scales often 
rely on conflicting assumptions.		
6	Another way of expressing this complexity is to say that living systems have multiple 
constraints that are non-holonomic and coordinated across levels (Pattee 1971; Hooker 2013).  
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4. The Explanatory Importance of Constraints 
This paper has aimed to clarify the interpretation of downward causation as the influence of 
constraining relations between structures and processes at higher scales to those at lower 
scales (or levels). Given the emphasis in science and philosophy of science on laws and 
temporal causal relations, an objection to the account presented here may be that redefining 
downward causation through constraining relations weakens its explanatory importance. In 
concluding, I further defend the importance of constraints modeling and explanation.  
Sections 2 and 3 presented resistance to the view that a lower level should always be 
granted higher explanatory priority. The tyranny of scales problem in both physics and biology 
makes macroscale parameters and models indispensable because lower-scale measurements 
and models cannot account for all relevant aspects of multiscale systems. More generally, 
considering constraints merely as explanatory background conditions overlooks the fact that 
constraints can provide access to dynamic states or trajectories that are inaccessible to the 
unconstrained system (Bechtel 2017; Hooker 2013). Constraints delimit the possible 
relationships between system variables, and they thus define boundaries and limits for causal 
processes (or for solutions to mathematical equations describing such processes). Many 
phenomena cannot be understood, or would not even be physically possible, without 
boundaries that organize and constrain lower-scale processes (Noble 2012). If boundary 
conditions are indispensable for describing and constituting lower-level processes, such as the 
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oscillatory dynamics of ionic channeling in the heart rhythm, it confounds the assumption that 
these cannot be granted an explanatory role. 
The importance of constraining relations for understanding the properties and 
functioning of natural systems raises an interesting question. Why have constraints and 
boundary conditions not figured more prominently in philosophical accounts of modeling and 
explanation? The failure of the covering-law model of explanation to account for the 
explanatory role of boundary conditions has been discussed by Bursten (2015), and I shall 
here mainly guess why constraints have not been more adequately discussed by philosophers 
of biology (see however Bechtel 2017; Pattee 1971).  
One possible answer is that models in biology often background constraints because 
empirical studies typically require that these are ignored or held fixed. To exemplify, data on 
genetic difference-making is typically acquired through experimental designs and models that 
require biomechanical constraints and environmental conditions to be constant. Accordingly, it 
is not surprising that these factors are not prioritized in explanations of genetic difference-
making in molecular developmental biology and related fields (Rosenberg 1997). But the fact 
that backgrounding or fixing such conditions is a methodological requirement also reveals that 
the resulting models and explanations cannot be used to dismiss the explanatory relevance of 
these factors for understanding the overall system (see also Laubichler and Wagner 2001; 
Robert 2004; Brigandt and Love 2017). Multiscale modeling can help identify which aspects 
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are central (or can be ignored) at different scales and to provide a more systemic examination 
of whether there is a more fundamental causal level when attempting to a system as a whole.  
Recent insights from multiscale modeling in biology provide insights to the importance 
of macroscale (biomechanical) constraints for biological functions. In the context of 
developmental biology, new experimental techniques allow for investigating the effects of 
altered biomechanical constraints on the course of development. By altering the mechanical 
signals from the environment, the coupling of cell layers, as well as the stiffness of substrates, 
researchers have found that biomechanical properties of macroscale structures can influence 
gene expression, signaling pathways, and cell differentiation (Miller and Davidson 2013). If 
the fate and movement of cells depend on biomechanical properties of macroscale structures, 
the assumption that such factors are just non-explanatory background conditions is severely 
challenged. Similarly, we have seen that modeling of the propagation of electrical signals in 
the heart requires identification of macroscale parameters such as axon radius and resistance 
and geometry of tissue types, because such boundary conditions are required to solve the 
equations describing lower-level processes. Downward causation may thus not only be 
important for understanding the system as a whole but also for adequately capturing lower-
level processes. 
In summary, I have defended the view that downward causation can be reinterpreted as 
constraining relations that are mathematically expressed via boundary conditions on lower-
level models. I have argued that such conditions cannot be reduced to explanatory background 
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conditions for lower-level models. The tyranny of scale problem implies that lower-level 
models cannot provide a unifying framework for understanding multiscale systems as a whole. 
Rather, different mathematical models are needed to represent features characteristic of 
specific scales. Moreover, whereas lower-scale models can provide microscale components to 
meso- or macroscale models, the behavior of lower-level processes are also influenced and 
constituted by macroscale constraints. Downward causation, thus understood, is not 
mysterious but an important feature of multiscale systems that practicing scientists are 
continuously developing challenges to account for.  
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